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Abstract. From 30.11. to 05.12.2008, the Dagstuhl Seminar 08491 The-
oretical Foundations of Practical Information Security  was held in
Schloss Dagstuhl  Leibniz Center for Informatics. During the seminar,
several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work
and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given
during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are
put together in this paper. The ﬁrst section describes the seminar top-
ics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are
provided, if available.
Keywords. Organic computing, self-organisation, design, adaptivity
08491 Executive Summary  Theoretical Foundations of
Practical Information Security
Designing, building, and operating secure information processing systems is a
complex task, and the only scientiﬁc way to address the diverse challenges aris-
ing throughout the life-cycle of security criticial systems is to consolidate and
increase the knowledge of the theoretical foundations of practical security prob-
lems. To this aim, the mutual exchange of ideas across individual security re-
search communities can be extraordinary beneﬁcial. Accordingly, the motivation
of this Dagstuhl seminar was the integration of diﬀerent research areas with the
common goal of providing an integral theoretical basis that is needed for the
design of secure information processing systems.
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 08491
Theoretical Foundations of Practical Information Security
http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1894
2 Ran Canetti, Shaﬁ Goldwasser, Günter Müller and Rainer Steinwandt
Keywords: Organic computing, self-organisation, design, adaptivity
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Theoretical Foundations of Privacy Notions
Jens-Matthias Bohli (NEC Laboratories Europe - Heidelberg, DE)
We present a hierarchy of privacy notions that covers multiple anonymity and
unlinkability variants. The underlying deﬁnitions, which are based on the idea of
indistinguishability between two worlds, provide new insights into the relation
between, and the fundamental structure of, diﬀerent privacy notions. We apply
the deﬁnitions to a number of privacy-preserving systems, namely group signa-
tures, voting systems, and anonymous communication systems, and show how
they relate to existing deﬁnitions.
Keywords: Privacy, group signatures, anonymous channels
Joint work of: Bohli, Jens-Matthias; Pashalidis, Andreas
Weak Veriﬁable Pseudorandom Functions
Zvika Brakerski (Weizmann Institute - Rehovot, IL)
Veriﬁable random functions (VRFs), introduced by Micali, Rabin and Vadhan,
are pseudorandom functions in which the owner of the seed produces a public-
key that constitutes a commitment to all values of the function. It can then
produce, for any input x, a proof that the function has been evaluated correctly
on x, preserving pseudorandomness for all other inputs. No public-key (even a
falsely generated one) allows for proving more than one value per input (compare
to signature schemes where soundness is only required for legal public-keys).
VRFs are both a natural and a useful primitive, and previous works have
suggested a variety of constructions and applications. Still, there are many open
questions in the study of VRFs, especially their relation to more widely studied
cryptographic primitives and constructing them from a wide variety of crypto-
graphic assumptions.
In this work we deﬁne a natural relaxation of VRFs that we call weak ver-
iﬁable random functions, where pseudorandomness is required to hold only for
randomly selected inputs. We conduct a study of weak VRFs, focusing on appli-
cations, constructions, and their relationship to other cryptographic primitives.
We show:
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 Constructions. We present constructions of weak VRFs based on a variety
of assumptions, including general assumptions such as (enhanced) trapdoor
permutations, as well as constructions based on speciﬁc number-theoretic
assumptions such as the Diﬃe-Hellman assumption in bilinear groups.
 Separations. Veriﬁable random functions (both weak and standard) cannot
be constructed from one-way permutations in a black-box manner. This con-
stitutes the ﬁrst result separating (standard) VRFs from any cryptographic
primitive. While pseudorandom functions (without veriﬁability) and veriﬁ-
able functions (or signature schemes) can each be constructed from one-way
functions (using black-box reductions), we show that veriﬁable random func-
tions (both weak and standard) cannot be constructed from one-way per-
mutations in a black-box manner. This constitutes the ﬁrst result separating
(standard) VRFs from any cryptographic primitive.
 Applications.Weak VRFs capture the essence of constructing non-interactive
zero-knowledge proofs for all NP languages.
Joint work of: Brakerski, Zvika; Goldwasser, Shaﬁ; Rothblum, Guy; Vaikun-
tanathan, Vinod
Reduction of the Threshold Gap in Algebraic Geometric
Secret Sharing
Ronald Cramer (CWI - Amsterdam, NL)
With Hao Chen (Shanghai) I showed that quasi-threshold linear secret sharing
schemes with strong multiplication and corruption tolerance arbitrarily close to
the limit 1/3n, exist over *ﬁxed* base ﬁelds, using asymptotically good towers
of algebraic function ﬁelds (CRYPTO 2006).
As a result, secure computation can be performed over ﬁxed base ﬁelds,
instead of over a ﬁeld whose cardinality is linear in the size of the network. In
certain scenarios this gives important savings in the amount of communication.
In recent joint work with Hao Chen, Chaoping Xing (Singapore) and Nacho
Cascudo Pueyo (Oviedo), I showed that the (unavoidable) gap between privacy
and reconstruction in such schemes can be reduced and that in fact such schemes
exists over any ﬁnite ﬁeld (not just the ones whose cardinality is a square). This
is all by more advanced methods from the theory of function ﬁelds (compared to
our earlier basic construction). We also improved a lower bound due to Karchmer
and Wigderson (1993), and showed that if the gap does not grow fast enough, any
linear secret sharing scheme respecting the gap will have vanishing information
rate.
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One-Round Authenticated Key Agreement from Weak
Secrets
Yevgeniy Dodis (Courant Institute - New York, US)
We study the question of information-theoretically secure authenticated key
agreement from weak secrets. In this setting, Alice and Bob share a n-bit se-
cret W, which might *not* be uniformly random but the adversary has at least
k bits of uncertainty about it (formalized using conditional min-entropy).
Alice and Bob wish to use W to agree on a nearly uniform secret key R, over
a public channel controlled by an *active* adversary Eve. We show that non-
interactive (single-message) protocols do not work when k <= n/2, and require
poor parameters even when n/2 < k << n.
On the other hand, for arbitrary values of k, we design a communication
eﬃcient two-message (i.e, **one-round**!) protocol extracting nearly k random
bits. This dramatically improves the only previously known protocol of Renner
and Wolf [RW03], which required O(s) rounds where s is the security parameter.
Our solution takes a new approach by studying and constructing **non-malleable
seeded randomness extractors **  if an attacker sees a random seed X and
comes up with an arbitrarily related seed X ′, then we bound the relationship
between R = Ext(W ;X) and R′ = Ext(W ;X ′).
We also extend our one-round key agreement protocol to the "fuzzy" setting,
where Alice and Bob share "close (but not equal) secretsW_A andW_B, and
to the Bounded Retrieval Model (BRM) where the size of the secret W is huge.
Keywords: Authenticated key agreement, information-theoretic security, non-
malleable extractors
Accessible Entropy
Iftach Haitner (Microsoft Research New England - Cambridge, US)
We put forth a new computational notion of entropy, which measures the (in)-
feasibility of sampling high entropy strings that are consistent with a given pro-
tocol. Speciﬁcally, we say that the i'th round of a protocol (A,B) has *accessible
entropy* at most k, if no polynomial-time strategy A* can generate messages
for A such that the entropy of its message in the ith round has entropy greater
than k when conditioned both on prior messages of the protocol and on prior
coin tosses of A*.
As applications of this notion, we
 Give a much simpler and more eﬃcient construction of statistically hiding
commitment schemes from arbitrary one-way functions, and
 Prove that constant-round statistically hiding commitments are necessary
for constructing constant-round zero-knowledge proof systems for NP that
remain secure under parallel composition (assuming the existence of one-way
functions).
Theoretical Foundations of Practical Information Security 5
Joint work with Omer Reingold, Salil Vadhan and Hoeteck Wee.
Keywords: Computational complexity, cryptography, commitment schemes,
interactive hashing, zero knowledge, one-way functions
Joint work of: Haitner, Iftach; Reingold, Omer; Vadhan, Salil; Wee, Hoeteck
Practical chosen-ciphertext secure encryption from
factoring
Dennis Hofheinz (CWI - Amsterdam, NL)
We propose a new public-key encryption scheme. The scheme is practical and its
security against chosen-ciphertext attacks can be reduced in the standard model
to the assumption that factoring is intractable.
Keywords: Public-key encryption, chosen-ciphertext security, factoring
Joint work of: Hofheinz, Dennis; Kiltz, Eike
Partial Fairness in Secure Two-Party Computation
Jonathan Katz (University of Maryland - College Park, US)
Complete fairness is impossible to achieve, in general, in secure two-party com-
putation. In light of this, various techniques for obtaining partial fairness in
this setting have been suggested. We explore the possibility of achieving partial
fairness with respect to a strong, simulation-based deﬁnition of security within
the standard real/ideal world paradigm. We show feasibility with respect to this
deﬁnition for randomized functionalities where each player may possibly receive
a diﬀerent output, as long as at least one of the domains or ranges of the func-
tionality are polynomial in size. When one of the domains is polynomial size,
our protocol is also secure-with-abort.
In contrast to much of the earlier work on partial fairness, we rely on standard
assumptions only (namely, enhanced trapdoor permutations).
We also show that our results are optimal. Speciﬁcally, we show a boolean
function deﬁned on domains of super-polynomial size for which it is impossible to
achieve both partial fairness and security with abort, and show a function whose
domains and ranges all have super-polynomial size for which partial fairness is
impossible altogether.
Keywords: Secure computation, fairness
Joint work of: Gordon, Dov; Katz, Jonathan
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Sound and Fine-grain Speciﬁcation of Ideal Functionalities
Aggelos Kiayias (University of Connecticut - Storrs, US)
Nowadays it is widely accepted to formulate the security of a protocol carrying
out a given task via the "trusted-party paradigm", where the protocol execution
is compared with an ideal process where the outputs are computed by a trusted
party that sees all the inputs. A protocol is said to securely carry out a given
task if running the protocol with a realistic adversary amounts to "emulating"
the ideal process with the appropriate trusted party. In the Universal Compos-
ability (UC) framework the program run by the trusted party is called an ideal
functionality. While this simulation-based security formulation provides strong
security guarantees, its usefulness is contingent on the properties and correct
speciﬁcation of the ideal functionality, which, as demonstrated in recent years
by the coexistence of complex, multiple functionalities for the same task as well
as by their "unstable" nature, does not seem to be an easy task.
In this paper we address this problem, by introducing a general methodology
for the sound speciﬁcation of ideal functionalities. First, we introduce the class
of canonical ideal functionalities for a cryptographic task, which uniﬁes the syn-
tactic speciﬁcation of a large class of cryptographic tasks under the same basic
template functionality. Furthermore, this representation enables the isolation of
the individual properties of a cryptographic task as separate members of the
corresponding class. By endowing the class of canonical functionalities with an
algebraic structure we are able to combine basic functionalities to a single ﬁnal
canonical functionality for a given task. Eﬀectively, this puts forth a bottom-up
approach for the speciﬁcation of ideal functionalities: ﬁrst one deﬁnes a set of
basic constituent functionalities for the task at hand, and then combines them
into a single ideal functionality taking advantage of the algebraic structure.
In our framework, the constituent functionalities of a task can be derived
either directly or, following a translation strategy we introduce, from existing
game-based deﬁnitions; such deﬁnitions have in many cases captured desired
individual properties of cryptographic tasks, albeit in less adversarial settings
than universal composition. Our translation methodology entails a sequence of
steps that derive a corresponding canonical functionality given a game-based
deﬁnition. In this way, we obtain a well-deﬁned mapping of game-based security
properties to their corresponding UC counterparts.
Finally, we demonstrate the power of our approach by applying our method-
ology to a variety of basic cryptographic tasks, including commitments, digital
signatures, zero-knowledge proofs, and oblivious transfer.
While in some cases our derived canonical functionalities are equivalent to
existing formulations, thus attesting to the validity of our approach, in others
they diﬀer, enabling us to "debug" previous deﬁnitions and pinpoint their short-
comings.
Keywords: Security deﬁnitions, universal composability, cryptographic proto-
cols, lattices and partial orders
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Joint work of: Garay, Juan; Kiayias, Aggelos; Zhou, Hong-Sheng
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1891
Joint State Theorems for Public-Key Encryption and
Digitial Signature Functionalities with Local Computation
Ralf Küsters (Universität Trier, DE)
Composition theorems in simulation-based approaches allow to build complex
protocols from sub-protocols in a modular way. However, as ﬁrst pointed out and
studied by Canetti and Rabin, this modular approach often leads to impractical
implementations. For example, when using a functionality for digital signatures
within a more complex protocol, parties have to generate new veriﬁcation and
signing keys for every session of the protocol. This motivates to generalize com-
position theorems to so-called joint state theorems, where diﬀerent copies of a
functionality may share some state, e.g., the same veriﬁcation and signing keys.
In this work, we present a joint state theorem which is more general than
the original theorem of Canetti and Rabin, for which several problems and limi-
tations are pointed out. We apply our theorem to obtain joint state realizations
for three functionalities: public-key encryption, replayable public-key encryption,
and digital signatures. Unlike most other formulations, our functionalities model
that ciphertexts and signatures are computed locally, rather than being provided
by the adversary. To obtain the joint state realizations, the functionalities have
to be designed carefully. Other formulations are shown to be unsuitable. Our
work is based on a recently proposed, rigorous model for simulation-based secu-
rity by Küsters, called the IITM model. Our deﬁnitions and results demonstrate
the expressivity and simplicity of this model. For example, unlike Canetti's UC
model, in the IITM model no explicit joint state operator needs to be deﬁned
and the joint state theorem follows immediately from the composition theorem
in the IITM model.
Joint work with Max Tuengerthal (CSF 2008)
Keywords: Simulation-based security, joint state theorem
Joint work of: Küsters, Ralf; Tuengerthal, Max
Simple, Black-Box Constructions of Adaptively Secure
Protocols
Tal Malkin (Columbia University, US)
We present a new compiler for transforming an oblivious transfer (OT) protocol
secure against an adaptive semi-honest adversary into one that is secure against
an adaptive malicious adversary.
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Our compiler achieves security in the universal composability framework, as-
suming access to an ideal commitment functionality. Our compiler improves over
previous work achieving the same security guarantee in two ways: it uses black-
box access to the underlying protocol and achieves a constant multiplicative
overhead in the round complexity. As a corollary, we obtain the ﬁrst construc-
tions of adaptively secure protocols in the stand-alone model using black-box
access to a low-level primitive.
Joint work of: Choi, Seung Geol; Dachman-Soled, Dana; Malkin, Tal; Wee,
Hoeteck
Wireless Physical Layer Key Exchange
Jörn Müller-Quade (Universität Karlsruhe, DE)
Secure wireless key on the physical layer allows a key exchange independent
of computational assumptions. The precise conditions, however, for such a key
exchange to be secure remain unclear. In this work we claim that a security
analysis of such protocols must be done on a rigorous physical layer, because the
abstract stochastic models used in communication theory might overestimate the
level of noise present. This is no problem for error correction applications, but for
security protocols this noise is a resource and it should rather be conservatively
underestimated to obtain reliable security gurantees.
In the concrete example of a key exchange based on multipath interference
and the reciprocity of the wireless channel we show that (in a simpliﬁed model)
each single signal received by an eavesdroper is uncorrelated to the key obtained
by the legitimite players (Alice and Bob). This uncorrelatedness is (implicitly)
used as an argument fort he security of the key exchange. However, as soon as
Eve receives two signals (as it ist he case for reciprocity based key exchange)
the eavesdropper can reconstruct the key. Diﬀerent uses of a channel may hence
not be modelled by uncorrelated stochastic processes. Furthermore we present
a side channel attack on reciprocity based key exchange which was neglected so
far.
A novel reciprocity based key exchange protocol is introduced which seems
to cope with the problems presented in this work, but a proper model of security
to prove such claims remains an important task for future work.
Keywords: Wireless, Reciprocity, Key Exchange
Joint work of: Almeida, Antonio, Döttling, Nico, Gabel, Matthias, Müller-
Quade, Jörn
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How Fair Can a Coin Toss Be?
Moni Naor (Weizmann Institute - Rehovot, IL)
Coin-ﬂipping protocols allow mutually distrustful parties to generate a common
unbiased random bit, guaranteeing that even if one of the parties is malicious,
it cannot signiﬁcantly bias the output of the honest party.
A classical result by Cleve from STOC 1986 showed that without simulta-
neous broadcast, for any two-party coin-ﬂipping protocol with r rounds, there
exists an eﬃcient adversary that can bias the output of the honest party by
Omega(1/r). However, the best previously known protocol only guarantees
O(1/sqrt(r)) bias and Cleve and Impagliazzo have shown that this is optimal in
the fail-stop model.
We establish the optimal tradeoﬀ between the round complexity and the
maximal bias of two-party coin-ﬂipping protocols. Under standard assumptions,
we show that Cleve's lower bound is tight: we construct an r-round protocol
with bias O(1/r). We make use of recent progress by Gordon, Hazay, Katz and
Lindell regarding fair protocols (STOC 2008).
Joint work with Tal Moran and Gil Segev
Joint work of: Tal Moran, Moni Naor and Gil Segev
Full Paper:
http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/%7Enaor/PAPERS/optimal_coin.pdf
Game Theory with Costly Computation
Rafael Pass (Cornell University - Ithaca, US)
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic
agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many tra-
ditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium)
no longer hold. Nevertheless, we can use the framework to provide psychologi-
cally appealing explanations to observed behavior in well-studied games (such
as ﬁnitely repeated prisoner's dilemma and rock-paper-scissors). Furthermore,
we provide natural conditions on games suﬃcient to guarantee that equilibria
exist.
As an application of this framework, we provide a game-theoretic deﬁnition
of protocol security. We show that a special case of this notion is equivalent
to a variant of the traditional cryptographic deﬁnition of protocol security; this
results shows that, when taking computation into account, the two approaches
used for dealing with deviating players in two diﬀerent communitiesNash
equilibrium in game theory, and zero-knowledge simulation in cryptography
are intimately related.
Joint work with Joe Halpern
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Public-Key Cryptosystems from the Worst-Case Shortest
Vector Problem
Chris Peikert (SRI - Menlo Park, US)
We construct public-key cryptosystems that are secure assuming the *worst-
case* hardness of approximating the shortest vector problem on lattices. Prior
cryptosystems with worst-case connections (e.g., the Ajtai-Dwork system) were
based either on a *special case* of the shortest vector problem, or on the con-
jectured hardness of lattice problems for *quantum* algorithms.
Our main technical innovation is a reduction from certain variants of the
shortest vector problem to corresponding versions of the "learning with errors"
(LWE) problem; previously, only a quantum reduction of this kind was known.
In addition, we construct new cryptosystems based on LWE, including a very
natural chosen ciphertext-secure system that has a much simpler description and
tighter underlying worst-case approximation factor than prior constructions.
Keywords: Lattice-based cryptography, learning with errors, quantum compu-
tation
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1892
Modeling Computational Security in Long-Lived Systems
Olivier Pereira (University of Louvain, BE)
For many cryptographic protocols, security relies on the assumption that adver-
sarial entities have limited computational power.
This type of security degrades progressively over the lifetime of a protocol.
However, some cryptographic services, such as timestamping services or digital
archives, are long-lived in nature; they are expected to be secure and operational
for a very long time (i.e. super-polynomial). In such cases, security cannot be
guaranteed in the traditional sense: a computationally secure protocol may be-
come insecure if the attacker has a super-polynomial number of interactions with
the protocol. This paper proposes a new paradigm for the analysis of long-lived
security protocols. We allow entities to be active for a potentially unbounded
amount of real time, provided they perform only a polynomial amount of work
per unit of real time. Moreover, the space used by these entities is allocated
dynamically and must be polynomially bounded. We propose a new notion of
long-term implementation, which is an adaptation of computational indistin-
guishability to the long-lived setting. We show that long-term implementation
is preserved under polynomial parallel composition and exponential sequential
composition.
We illustrate the use of this new paradigm by analyzing some security prop-
erties of the long-lived timestamping protocol of Haber and Kamat.
Keywords: Long lived security, universally composable security
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Leakage-Resilient Cryptography: Theoretical Foundations
of Side-Channel Security
Krzysztof Pietrzak (CWI - Amsterdam, NL)
Below is the abstract of a joint paper with Stefan Dziembowski (FOCS'08) on
which much of the talk is based.
We construct a stream-cipher SC whose implementation is secure even if a
bounded amount of arbitrary (adversarially chosen) information on the internal
state of SC is leaked during computation. This captures all possible side-channel
attacks on SC where the amount of information leaked in a given period is
bounded, but overall can be arbitrary large. The only other assumption we make
on the implementation of S is that only data that is accessed during computation
leaks information.
The stream-cipher SC generates its output in chunks K1,K2,. . . and arbi-
trary but bounded information leakage is modeled by allowing the adversary to
adaptively chose a function f` : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ before K` is computed, she
then gets f`(τ`) where τ` is the internal state of S that is accessed during the
computation of K`.
One notion of security we prove for S is that K` is indistinguishable from
random when given K1, . . . ,K`−1, f1(τ1), . . . , f`−1(τ`−1) and also the complete
internal state of S after K` has been computed (i.e. S is forward-secure).
The construction is based on alternating extraction (used in the intrusion-
resilient secret-sharing scheme from FOCS'07). We move this concept to the
computational setting by proving a lemma that states that the output of any
PRG has high HILL pseudoentropy (i.e. is indistinguishable from some distri-
bution with high min-entropy) even if arbitrary information about the seed is
leaked. The amount of leakage λ that we can tolerate in each step depends on
the strength of the underlying PRG, it is at least logarithmic, but can be as
large as a constant fraction of the internal state of S if the PRG is exponentially
hard.
Keywords: Side-channel, stream-cipher, leakage-resilience, extractors
Joint work of: Pietrzak, Krzysztof; Dziembowski, Stefan
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Founding Cryptography on Oblivious Transfer  Eﬃciently
Manoj Prabhakaran (University of Illinois - Urbana, US)
We present a simple and eﬃcient compiler for transforming secure multi-party
computation (MPC) protocols that enjoy security only with an honest major-
ity into MPC protocols that guarantee security with no honest majority, in
the oblivious-transfer (OT) hybrid model. Our technique works by combining
a secure protocol in the honest majority setting with a protocol achieving only
security against semi-honest parties in the setting of no honest majority.
Applying our compiler to variants of protocols from the literature, we get
several applications for secure two-party computation and for MPC with no
honest majority. These include:
 Constant-rate two-party computation in the OT-hybrid model.We
obtain a statistically UC-secure two-party protocol in the OT-hybrid model
that can evaluate a general circuit C of size s and depth d with a total
communication complexity of O(s)+(k, d, log s) and O(d) rounds. The above
result generalizes to a constant number of parties.
 Extending OTs in the malicious model. We obtain a computationally
eﬃcient protocol for generating many string OTs from few string OTs with
only a constant amortized communication overhead compared to the total
length of the string OTs.
 Black-box constructions for constant-round MPC with no honest
majority. We obtain general computationally UC-secure MPC protocols in
the OT-hybrid model that use only a constant number of rounds, and only
make a black-box access to a pseudorandom generator. This gives the ﬁrst
constant-round protocols for three or more parties that only make a black-
box use of cryptographic primitives (and avoid expensive zero-knowledge
proofs).
Keywords: Multi-party computation, Oblivious transfer, UC security
See also: @inproceedingsDBLP:conf/crypto/IshaiPS08, author = Yuval Ishai
and Manoj Prabhakaran and Amit Sahai, title = Founding Cryptography on
Oblivious Transfer - Eﬃciently, booktitle = CRYPTO, year = 2008, pages =
572-591, ee = http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85174-5_32,
crossref = DBLP:conf/crypto/2008, bibsource 	DBLP, http://dblp.uni-trier.de
Fairness with an honest minority and a rational majority
Alon Rosen (The Interdisciplinary Center - Herzliya, IL)
I will present a simple protocol for secret reconstruction in any threshold secret
sharing scheme, and argue that it is fair when executed with many rational
parties together with a small minority of honest parties.
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That is, all parties will learn the secret with high probability when the honest
parties follow the protocol and the rational parties act in their own self-interest.
The protocol only requires a standard (synchronous) broadcast channel, and
tolerates arbitrary deviations (including early stopping and incorrectly computed
messages).
Previous protocols for this problem in the cryptographic or economic models
have either required an honest majority, used strong communication channels
that enable simultaneous exchange of information, or settled for approximate
notions of security/equilibria.
Joint work with Shien Jin Ong, David Parkes and Salil Vadhan.
When and How Can Data be Eﬃciently Released with
Privacy?
Guy Rothblum (MIT - Cambridge, US)
We consider private data analysis in the setting in which a trusted and trustwor-
thy curator, having obtained a data set containing sensitive information, releases
to the public a "sanitization of the data set. The goal is for the sanitization to
both protect the privacy of the individual contributors of data and oﬀer aggre-
gate statistical utility to a data analyst. We focus on the case where the process
is non-interactive; once the sanitization has been released the original data and
the curator play no further role.
Blum et al. [STOC '08] showed a remarkable result: for any collection of
counting predicate queries, the exponential mechanism of McSherry and Tal-
war [FOCS '07] can be used to (ineﬃciently) generate a synthetic dataset that
maintains approximately correct fractional counts for all of the queries, while
ensuring a strong privacy guarantee, known as diﬀerential privacy.
In this work we investigate the computational complexity of such non-interactive
privacy mechanisms, mapping the boundary between feasibility and infeasibility.
We show:
1. For any query set C and data universe X there is an eﬃcient sanitizer that
outputs a synthetic dataset and runs in time poly(|C|,|X|). The sanitizer works
even when the size of the original dataset is sub-polynomial in |C|.
2. Under standard cryptographic assumptions, there is no sanitizer that out-
puts synthetic datasets and works for general classes of counting queries and
runs in time sub-polynomial in |C| or |X|. In particular, this is a case where the
exponential mechanism cannot, in general, be implemented eﬃciently.
3. Turning to the potentially easier problem of privately generating an arbi-
trary data structure (not necessarily synthetic data), there is a tight connection
between hardness of sanitization and the existence of traitor tracing schemes.
Joint work of: Dwork, Cynthia; Naor, Moni; Reingold, Omer; Rothblum, Guy;
Vadhan, Salil
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Chosen-Ciphertext Security via Correlated Products
Gil Segev (Weizmann Institute - Rehovot, IL)
We initiate the study of one-wayness under "correlated products". We are in-
terested in identifying necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a function f and
a distribution on inputs (x1, ..., xk), so that the function (f(x1), ..., f(xk)) is
one-way. The main motivation of this study is the construction of public-key
encryption schemes that are secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA).
We show that any collection of injective trapdoor functions that is secure un-
der a very natural correlated product can be used to construct a CCA-secure
public-key encryption scheme. The construction is simple, black-box, and admits
a direct proof of security.
We provide evidence that security under correlated products is achievable by
demonstrating that lossy trapdoor functions (Peikert and Waters, STOC '08)
yield injective trapdoor functions that are secure under the above mentioned cor-
related product. Although we eventually base security under correlated products
on existing constructions of lossy trapdoor functions, we argue that the former
notion is potentially weaker as a general assumption. Speciﬁcally, there is no
fully-black-box construction of lossy trapdoor functions from trapdoor functions
that are secure under correlated products.
Joint work of: Rosen, Alon; Segev, Gil
Abstractions for Cryptographically Faithful Proofs of
Security Protocols
Christoph Sprenger (ETH Zürich, CH)
In this talk, I will present a formal theory for cryptographically-sound theorem
proving. Our starting point is the Backes-Pﬁtzmann-Waidner (BPW) model,
which is a symbolic protocol model that is cryptographically sound in the sense of
blackbox reactive simulatability. To achieve cryptographic soundness, this model
is substantially more complex than standard symbolic models and the main
challenge in formalizing and using this model is overcoming this complexity. We
have constructed a series of cryptographically-sound abstractions of the original
BPW model that bring it much closer to standard Dolev-Yao style models. I
will present a case study showing that our abstractions enable proofs of size
and complexity comparable to those based on Paulson's much simpler inductive
method. Our entire development has been formalized in the theorem prover
Isabelle/HOL.
Based on joint work with Michael Backes, David Basin, Birgit Pﬁtzmann and
Michael Waidner.
Keywords: Security protocols, cryptographic soundness, reactive simulatability,
theorem proving, higher-order logic
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A Functionality for Symmetric Encryption in
Simulation-based Security
Max Tuengerthal (Universität Trier, DE)
For most basic cryptographic tasks, such as public-key encryption, digital signa-
tures, authentication, key exchange, and many other more sophisticated tasks,
ideal functionalities in the simulation-based security approach have been formu-
lated, along with their realizations.
Surprisingly, however, no such functionality exists for symmetric encryption,
except for a more abstract Dolev-Yao style functionality.
In this work, we ﬁll this gap. We propose two functionalities for symmetric en-
cryption, an unauthenticated and an authenticated version, and show that they
can be implemented based on standard cryptographic assumptions for symmetric
encryption schemes, namely IND-CCA security and authenticated encryption,
respectively. We also illustrate the usefulness of our functionalities in applica-
tions, both in simulation-based and game-based security settings.
Keywords: Cryptographic protocols, simulation-based security
Joint work of: Kuesters, Ralf; Tuengerthal, Max
Security of public key encryption under key dependent
messages
Dominique Unruh (Universität des Saarlandes, DE)
Commonly, security of encryption schemes does not give any guarantees if the
plaintext may include or otherwise depend on the secret key. Encryption schemes
that are secure in the presence of key dependent messages were so far only
studied in the setting of private key cryptography. We explain why adapting the
existing deﬁnitions to the public key setting is diﬃcult and give the ﬁrst security
deﬁnition for public key encryption under key dependent messages. We show
that the OAEP encryption scheme is secure under key dependent messages in
the random oracle model.
Keywords: Encryption schemes, key dependent messages
Joint work of: Michael Backes; Markus Dürmuth; Unruh, Dominique
Full Paper:
http://www.infsec.cs.uni-sb.de/∼unruh/publications/backes08oaep.html
See also: Michael Backes, Markus Dürmuth, and Dominique Unruh. OAEP is
Secure Under Key-dependent Messages. ASIACRYPT 2008
16 Ran Canetti, Shaﬁ Goldwasser, Günter Müller and Rainer Steinwandt
Eﬃcient and Composable Oblivious Transfer
Vinod Vaikuntanathan (MIT - Cambridge, US)
We propose a simple and general framework for constructing oblivious transfer
(OT) protocols that are eﬃcient, universally composable, and generally realiz-
able from a variety of cryptographic assumptions, such as the decisional Diﬃe-
Hellman assumption, the Quadratic Residuosity assumption and worst-case com-
plexity assumptions relating to lattices. Our OT protocols are round-optimal
(one message each way) and eﬃcient in the parties' communication and local
computation.
One of our key technical contributions is a uniﬁed view of several encryption
schemes in the literature that have what we call message-lossy public keys, whose
deﬁning property is that a cipher-text produced under such a key carries no
information (even statistically) about the encrypted message.
Keywords: Oblivious Transfer, UC security




Mayank Varia (MIT - Cambridge, US)
Existing deﬁnitions of program obfuscation do not rule out malleability attacks,
where an adversary that sees an obfuscated program is able to generate another
(potentially obfuscated) program that is related to the original one in some way.
We formulate two natural ﬂavors of non-malleability requirements for pro-
gram obfuscation, and show that they are incomparable in general. We also
construct non-malleable obfuscators of both ﬂavors for some program families of
interest. Some of our constructions are in the Random Oracle model, whereas
another one is in the common reference string model. We also deﬁne the notion
of veriﬁable obfuscation which is of independent interest.
Keywords: Obfuscation, non-malleable
Joint work of: Canetti, Ran; Varia, Mayank
